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Abstract
This paper introduces a search problem where a consumer has to first become aware
of an alternative, before being able to search it. Initially, the consumer is aware of only
a few alternatives. During search, the consumer sequentially decides between searching
alternatives he is already aware of and expanding awareness to discover more products.
I show that the optimal policy for this search problem is fully characterized by simple
reservation values. Moreover, I prove that the purchase outcome of a consumer optimally
solving the search problem is equivalent to the consumer simply choosing the product
offering the largest value on a predetermined index.
1 Introduction
The existence and importance of search frictions have been well established.1 Under the rational
choice paradigm, search frictions continue to be studied relying on optimal search policies that
apply in either of two settings: (i) searchers have no prior information and search randomly
across alternatives (e.g. McCall, 1970; Lippman and McCall, 1976), and (ii) they are aware of
all available alternatives and order their searches based on partial information (e.g. Weitzman,
1979; Chade and Smith, 2006). In this paper, I add to this literature by developing and solving
a search problem where a consumer has limited awareness, and sequentially decides whether to
become aware of more alternatives or search any of the alternatives he is already aware of.
To fix ideas, consider a consumer looking to buy a mobile phone. Through advertising or
recommendations from friends, the consumer initially is aware of a few available phones and
has some (but not all) information on what these alternatives offer. Given this information, the
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r.p.greminger@tilburguniversity.edu. I am deeply grateful to my advisors, Tobias Klein and Jaap Ab-
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consumer can directly gather more information on these alternatives (e.g. by reading reviews
online). Besides, there are also other phones available that the consumer initially is not aware
of. For these alternatives the consumer has no information and does not know whether they
exist. This precludes the consumer from directly inspecting these phones. Instead, he first needs
to become aware of them (e.g. by getting more recommendations from friends or online sites).
In this case, limited awareness introduces a novel search problem, where the consumer not
only decides in what order to search products and when to stop searching, but also when to
become aware of more alternatives. Figure 1 provides an example of a choice sequence in such
a search and expansion problem. Initially, the consumer is only aware of Product 1 and decides
between either searching it or expanding awareness. After becoming aware of Product 2, the
consumer decides whether to expand further or search either of the two products. Finally, once
Product 2 has been searched, the consumer decides whether to buy Product 2 and end the
search, continue expanding, or search Product 1.
expand A
expand Asearch Product 2
expand Abuy Product 2search Product 1
search Product 1
search Product 1
Figure 1 – Search and awareness expansion. The consumer first expands aware-
ness, then searches and finally buys Product 2.
Environments where consumers face a search problem of this type often emerge in practice.
For example, in markets with a large number of alternatives, consumers usually will not have any
information on some alternatives. Similarly, in markets where rapid technological innovations
lead to a constant stream of newly available alternatives, few consumers are aware of new
releases without spending effort to remain informed. Consumers also face the same type of search
problem when buying products online. Online retailers and search intermediaries present visitors
with alternatives on a product list that reveals partial information only for some products.
Consumers then decide between clicking on products to reveal full information, and browsing
further along the list to discover more products.
Despite the complexity of the dynamic decision problem, the optimal policy is fully character-
ized by simple reservation values. More specifically, the optimal search policy is a generalization
of Pandora’s rule derived by Weitzman (1979). In each period, a reservation value is assigned to
each available action and it is optimal to always choose the action with the largest value. Each
of the reservation values is independent of any other available action, and can be calculated
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without explicitly considering a myriad of possible future choice sequences. Based on these
reservation values, it is then straightforward to analyze optimal search behavior under limited
awareness.
The second contribution of this paper is to prove that the purchase outcome of a consumer
solving the search and awareness expansion problem is equivalent to the same consumer hav-
ing full information and directly choosing the product on a predetermined index. This allows
deriving market demand without having to consider the multitude of possible choice sequences
that otherwise make aggregation difficult. Besides, this result generalizes the eventual purchase
theorem of Choi et al. (2018) to the case of limited awareness.2
Based on these technical results, I discuss two implications of limited awareness. First, as
search progresses, it becomes less and less likely that a consumer has not yet stopped searching.
Consequently, aggregate demand under limited awareness exhibits ranking effects; it decreases
in the position at which products are revealed.3 As I show using a simple example, these ranking
effects differ both from those generated by standard (sequential) random and directed search.
Second, a consumer’s search path is independent of alternatives the consumer is not aware of,
implying that the consumer fails to always first search the alternative that looks most promising
from partial information. The rationale is similar to how consumers fail to buy the preferred
alternative in discrete choice models when they have limited information (e.g. Goeree, 2008);
hence can have similar implications when using observed search paths to infer preference and
search cost parameters. To see this, consider again the example depicted in Figure 1, and
suppose a third product is available. At the time the consumer decides to search Product 2,
no information on the third product is available. Consequently, even when Product 3 yields a
larger expected valuation than Product 2, the consumer continues to first search Product 2.
To keep exposition clear and facilitate a comparison with recent consumer search models (e.g.
Armstrong, 2017; Choi et al., 2018), I present the search and awareness expansion problem using
assumptions that then are relaxed in several extensions. Cases where a reservation value policy
continues to be optimal include environments where (i) alternatives are ranked in decreasing
order of expected utility, (ii) awareness expansion reveals an unknown number of alternatives,
and (iii) multiple awareness expansion technologies are available.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly discuss related search
problems. The search and awareness expansion problem is introduced in Section 2. Section 3
provides the optimal policy and discusses extensions. In Section 4, I generalize the eventual
purchase theorem and show how it can be used to derive aggregate demand. Section 5 com-
pares search outcomes from alternative search problems using a simple example, and Section 6
2Choi et al. (2018) note that „Our eventual purchase theorem was anticipated by Armstrong and Vickers (2015)
and has been independently discovered by Armstrong (2017) and Kleinberg et al. (2017).”
3There is ample empirical evidence of ranking effects from online stores and search intermediaries, see e.g. Ursu
(2018) and references therein.
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concludes.
Related Search Problems
A range of sequential search problems is nested within the present framework. Most notable
is Pandora’s problem introduced by Weitzman (1979), which results when the consumer initially
is aware of all alternatives, or when there are no costs to becoming aware of more alternatives.4
Besides, the extensions presented also accommodate search problems where the consumer learns
while sampling from an unknown distribution (Kohn and Shavell, 1974; Rothschild, 1974; Rosen-
field and Shapiro, 1981; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 1996).
To prove the optimality of the reservation value policy, I take a different approach than early
contributions to search problems. Instead of directly proving that following the reservation value
policy maximizes expected total payoff, I use results from the multi-armed bandit literature to
first determine that a Gittins index policy is optimal,5 and then show that the Gittins index
reduces to the simple reservation values.
More specifically, I use the results of Keller and Oldale (2003), who showed that a Gittins
index policy is optimal in problems where choosing one action reveals more actions while leaving
the state of other available actions unchanged. Introducing monotonicity then allows me to
generalize their result to the case where with some probability no new actions are revealed, and
to show that the Gittins index can be calculated based on the myopic comparison of payoffs
that defines the reservation values.
Similar monotonicity conditions also apply in some multi-armed bandit problems where they
simplify the otherwise difficult calculation of the Gittins index values (see e.g. Section 2.11 in
Gittins et al., 2011). However, the present case differs in that monotonicity is only required for
the action of expanding awareness, but does not hold when searching a product.6
Several other contributions extend Weitzman’s (1979) seminal search problem in different
directions. Adam (2001) studies the case where the searcher updates beliefs about groups of
alternatives during search and finds a similar reservation value policy to be optimal. His search
problem is also nested in an extension presented in this paper. Olszewski and Weber (2015)
generalize Pandora’s rule to search problems where the final payoff depends on all the alternatives
that have been searched, not only the best one. Finally, Doval (2018) analyzes the optimal policy
when a searcher can directly choose alternatives without first searching them.
Other studies have estimated structural models that were based on search problems that are
suited for the particular environment. Most closely related is a recent working paper by Choi
4Others include classical stopping problems such as those considered in McCall (1970) or Lippman and McCall
(1976).
5Gittins et al. (2011) provide a textbook treatment of multi-armed bandit problems and the Gittins index policy.
As purchasing a product ends search, search problems correspond to stoppable superprocesses as introduced by
Glazebrook (1979).
6The utility revealed when searching a product with some probability is larger than the reservation value of
searching that product.
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and Mela (2019) where consumers also decide to reveal more products. The results presented
in this paper differ in two important ways. First, I provide a tractable optimal policy based on
reservation values, whereas Choi and Mela (2019) use numerical value function iteration to solve
for the optimal policy. Second, the search problem I study is more general; it does not limit
the decision of the consumer to only searching the latest revealed product, accommodates a
finite number of alternatives and does not require the consumer to know the number of available
alternatives. Note, however, that my results imply that as long as the consumer has not yet
revealed the last alternative, it will never be optimal to go back and search a product that was
revealed earlier. Hence my results provide a justification for studying a reduced search problem
where the consumer is precluded from searching a product that was revealed earlier.
Besides, Koulayev (2014) estimates a search model where consumers also decide whether to
reveal more products. In his model, however, revealing a product also reveals all information
on that product. Hence there is no need for search as considered in this paper.7
Finally, this paper is not the first to consider the concept of limited awareness. Honka et al.
(2017) and Morozov (2019) estimate structural search models where consumers also cannot
search products that they are not aware of. However, in their models, consumers cannot become
aware of more alternatives. The underlying search problem thus is equivalent to Pandora’s
problem introduced by Weitzman (1979).
2 The Search and Awareness Expansion Problem
A risk-neutral consumer with unit demand faces a market offering a (possibly infinite)8 number
of alternatives gathered in set J . Alternatives are heterogeneous with respect to their charac-
teristics. The consumer has preferences over these characteristics which can be expressed in
a utility ranking. To simplify exposition and facilitate a comparison to existing models from
the consumer search literature (e.g. Armstrong, 2017; Choi et al., 2018), I assume that the
consumer’s ex post utility when purchasing alternative j is given by
u(xj , yj) = xj + yj
where xj and yj are partial valuations derived from two distinct sets of characteristics. Note,
however, that the results presented continue to hold for more general specifications that do not
rely on linear additive utility.9 An outside option j = 0 of aborting search without a purchase
7Note also that Koulayev (2014) solves the dynamic decision problem using numerical backwards induction. For
the case where costs are increasing in time (which is the case in his results), the present results suggest that a
simple index policy also characterizes the optimal policy for his model.
8Note that the problems with infinitely many arms in a multi-armed bandit problem discussed by Banks and
Sundaram (1992) do not arise in the present setting.
9In particular, suppose that when the consumer becomes aware of alternative j, he reveals a signal on the distri-
bution from which the utility of j will be drawn. By appropriately defining the distribution of signals and the
distribution of utilities, conditional on these signals, the search problem then is equivalent to when the consumer
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is available.
Initially, the consumer has limited information on the available alternatives. More specifi-
cally, in period t the consumer knows both xj and yj only for products in a consideration set
Ct ⊆ J . For products in an awareness set St ⊆ J the consumer only knows xj . This captures
the notion that if the consumer is aware of a product, he has received some information on the
total valuation of the product. Finally, the consumer has no information on any other product
j ∈ J\ (St ∪ Ct).
During search, the consumer gathers information by sequentially deciding which action to
take next in periods t = 0, . . . , T . If the consumer decides to expand awareness, he discovers
ne more alternatives which are added to the awareness set. If less than ne alternatives have
not yet been revealed, only the remaining alternatives are revealed. For each of the ne alterna-
tives, partial product information summarized in the realization xj is revealed. Without loss of
generality, I assume that products are revealed in increasing order of their index.10 To reveal
the remaining characteristics of a product j, summarized in partial valuation yj , the consumer
has to search the product. This reveals full information on the product and moves it from the
awareness into the consideration set. The latter implies St ∩ Ct = ∅.
Two precedence constraints on the consumer’s actions are imposed. First, the consumer can
only buy products from the consideration set. Second, the consumer can only search products
from the awareness set. Whereas the first constraint is used in virtually all search problems,11
the later is novel to the proposed search problem. It implies that a product cannot be searched,
unless the consumer is aware of it. In an online setting where a consumer browses through a list
of products, this constraint holds naturally: Individual product pages are reached by clicking on
the respective link on the list. Hence unless a product has been revealed on the list, it cannot
be clicked on. In other environments, this precedence constraint reflects that, unless a consumer
knows whether an alternative exists, he will not be able to direct search efforts and search a
specific alternative. For example, if a consumer is not aware of a newly released phone model,
he will not be able to directly acquire detailed information on it, before becoming aware that it
exists.
Given the setting and these constraints, the consumer decides sequentially between the fol-
lowing actions:
i) Purchasing any product from the consideration set Ct and ending the search.
ii) Searching any product from the awareness set St, thus revealing yj for that product and
adding it to the consideration set.
iii) Expanding awareness, thus revealing xj for ne additional products and adding them to
the awareness set.
has linear additive utility.
10I.e. if ne = 2, the first expansion reveals x1 and x2, the second x3 and x4 etc.
11Doval (2018) is a notable exception.
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These actions are gathered in the set of available actions, At = Ct ∪ St ∪ e, where e indicates
expanding the awareness set St. If a consumer chooses an action a = j ∈ Ct, he buys product
j, whereas if he chooses an action a = j ∈ St, he searches product j.12 To clearly differentiate
between the different types of actions, this set can also be written as At = {b0, b3, s4, . . . , e},
where bj indicates purchasing and sj searching product j.
Both searching a product and expanding awareness is costly. Search and expansion costs are
denoted by cs > 0 and ce > 0 respectively. These costs can be interpreted as the cost of mental
effort necessary to evaluate the newly revealed information, or an opportunity cost of the time
spent evaluating the new information. In line with this interpretation, I assume that there is
free recall : Purchasing any of the products from the consideration set does not incur costs, and
cs is the same for searching any of the products in the awareness set.
The consumer has beliefs over the products that he will discover when expanding awareness,
as well as the partial valuations he will reveal when searching a product j. In particular, xj and
yj are independent (across j) realizations from random variables X and Y , where the consumer
has beliefs over their joint distribution.13 A generalization where the distribution of X depends
on index j is discussed in Section 3.
The consumer also has beliefs over the total number of available alternatives. I assume that
the consumer believes that with constant probability q ∈ [0, 1], the current expansion will be
the last.14 As shown in the next section, the optimal policy is independent of the number of
expansions that may be available in the future. Notice, however, that this belief specification
implicitly assumes that the consumer always knows whether he can reveal ne more alternatives.
An extension presented in Section 3 covers the case where the consumer does not know how
many alternatives are revealed when expanding awareness.
All information the consumer has in period t is summarized in the information tuple Ωt =〈
Ω¯, ωt
〉
. The tuple Ω¯ =
〈
u(x, v), ne, ce, cs, GX(x), FY |X=x(y), q
〉
represents the consumer’s initial
knowledge. It contains the utility function, the number of products revealed when expanding
the list, and the different costs. It also contains the consumer’s beliefs, denoted by the respective
cumulative densities GX(x) and FY |X=x(y). The latter specifies the cumulative density of Y ,
conditional on the realization of X, which is observed by the consumer before choosing to search
a product and realize y. As a short-hand notation, I use G(x) and F (y) for these distributions.
As a regularity condition, it is assumed that both G(x) and F (y)∀x have finite mean and
variance. Finally, Ω¯ contains the belief q on whether future expansions will be available.
12Note that Ct ∩ St = ∅.
13Note that the proposed policy is optimal conditional on beliefs. When beliefs are not correct, i.e. the true
distribution from which the valuations are drawn is not the same as the beliefs, then an alternative policy where
beliefs are updated during search could yield higher expected utility.
14Alternatively, one can specify these beliefs as a distribution over natural numbers. In this case, however, it
becomes necessary to specify how the consumer updates his beliefs during search. In doing so, results hold only
if the consumer updates beliefs such that the monotonicity condition (12) in the Appendix is satisfied (see also
the discussion in Section (3)).
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During search, the consumer reveals valuations xj and yj for the various products. This
information is tracked in the set ωt, containing the realizations xj for j ∈ St ∪ Ct and yj for
j ∈ Ct.
The set of available actions At and the information tuple Ωt are the two state variables. Fig-
ure 2 shows how they transition depending on the actions taken starting from period t = 0. The
depicted example assumes that there are only two alternatives available and that an expansion
only reveals a single alternative. If the consumer initially chooses the outside option (b0), no
new information is revealed, and no further actions remain. If the consumer instead expands
awareness, he reveals the first alternative, which then can be searched in t = 1. Furthermore,
as |J | = 2, he also can expand the awareness set once more.
Ω0 =
〈
Ω¯, {x0, y0}
〉
A0 = {b0, e}
Ω1 =
〈
Ω¯, {x0, y0}
〉
A1 = ∅
Ω1 =
〈
Ω¯, {x0, y0, x1}
〉
A1 = {b0, s1, e}
Ω2 =
〈
Ω¯, {x0, y0, x1}
〉
A2 = ∅
Ω2 =
〈
Ω¯, {x0, y0, x1, y1}
〉
A2 = {b0, b1}
Ω2 =
〈
Ω¯, {x0, y0, x1, x2}
〉
A2 = {b0, s1, s2}
e
s1
b0
e
b0
Figure 2 – Transition of state variables Ωt (information tuple) and At (set
of available actions) for ne = 1 and |J | = 2.
The Consumer’s Dynamic Decision Problem
The setting above describes a dynamic Markov decision process, where the consumer’s choice
of action determines the immediate rewards, as well as the state transitions. The state in t is
given by Ωt and At. As the valuations xj and yj can take on any (finite) real values, the
state space in general is infinite.15 Throughout, the state space is defined such that it does not
explicitly depend on time.
The consumer’s problem consists of finding a feasible sequential policy, which maximizes
the expected payoff of the whole decision process. A feasible sequential policy selects actions
{a0 ∈ A0, a1 ∈ A1, . . . } for periods t = 0, 1, . . . T based only on information available in period t.
Let Π denote the set containing all feasible policies. Formally, the consumer solves the following
15An exception is when xj and yj are drawn from discrete distributions, which limits the number of possible
valuations that can be observed.
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dynamic programming problem at period t = 0
max
pi∈Π
V0(Ω0, A0;pi)
where Vt(Ωt, At;pi) is the value function in period t, defined as the expected total payoff of
following policy pi starting in period t, conditional on the state in t. Let
[BaVt] (Ωt, At;pi) = R(a) + Et [Vt+1(Ωt+1, At+1;pi)|a]
denote the Bellman operator, where the immediate rewards R(a) either are search costs, expan-
sion costs, or the total valuation of a product j if it is bought. Hence immediate rewards R(a)
are known for all available actions. Et [Vt+1(It+1, At+1;pi)|a] denotes the expected total payoff
over the whole future, conditional on policy pi and having chosen action a in t.16 The expec-
tations operator integrates over the respective distributions of X and Y . A purchase in t ends
search such that At+1 = ∅ and Et [Vt+1(Ωt+1, ∅;pi)|a] = 0 whenever a ∈ Ct. The corresponding
Bellman equation is given by
Vt(Ωt, At;pi) = max
a∈At
[BaVt] (Ωt, At;pi)
3 Optimal Search and Awareness Expansion Policy
The optimal policy for the search and awareness problem is fully characterized by three reser-
vation values. In what follows, I first define these reservation values, before then stating the
main result. At the end of this section, I discuss possible extensions based on a monotonicity
condition, as well as limitations resulting from the condition that available actions need to be
independent.
As in Weitzman (1979), suppose there is a hypothetical outside option offering utility z.
Furthermore, suppose the consumer faces the following comparison of actions: Immediately
take the outside option and end the search, or search a product with known xj , and end the
search thereafter. In this decision, the consumer will choose to search whenever the following
holds:
Qs(xj , cs, z) ≡ EY [max{0, xj + Y − z}]− cs ≥ 0
Qs(xj , cs, z) defines the expectedmyopic net gain of searching product j over immediately taking
the outside option. If the realization of Y is such that xj+yj ≤ z, the consumer takes the outside
16In this formulation of the problem, the consumer does not discount future payoffs. This is in line with the
consumer search literature, which usually assumes a finite number of alternatives without discounting. However,
it is straightforward to show that the results continue to hold if a discount factor β < 1 is introduced. In this
case, the search and expansion values defined in the next section need to be adjusted accordingly.
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option after search and the gain is zero. When xj +yj > z, the gain over immediately taking the
outside option is xj + yj − z. The expectation operator EY [·] integrates over these outcomes.
The search value of product j, denoted by zsj , then is defined as the value offered by a
hypothetical outside option that makes the consumer indifferent in the above decision problem.
Formally, zsj satisfies
Qs(xj , cs, z
s
j ) = 0 (1)
which has a unique solution (see Lemma 1 in Adam, 2001). Conveniently, this can further be
simplified to
zsj = xj + ξj (2)
where ξj solves
∫∞
ξj
[1− F (yj)] dyj − cs = 0 (see Appendix B).
The purchase value of product j, denoted by zbj , is defined as the utility obtained when
buying product j:
zbj = u(xj , yj) (3)
Based on reservation values given by (1) and (3), Weitzman (1979) showed that it cannot
be optimal to search a product that does not offer the largest search value, or to stop when the
largest remaining search value exceeds the largest purchase value. Hence, for given St and Ct, it
is optimal to always search and buy in decreasing order of search and purchase values. However,
this rule does not fully characterize an optimal policy for the search and awareness expansion
problem, as the consumer can additionally expand awareness.
For this additional action, a third reservation value based on a similar myopic comparison
is introduced. Suppose the consumer faces the following comparison of actions: (i) Take a
hypothetical outside option offering z immediately, or (ii) expand awareness, and then search
through and buy one of the newly discovered products. The consumer will choose the latter
whenever the following holds:
Qe(ce, cs, z) ≡ EX
[
V
(〈
Ω¯, ω(X, z)
〉
, {b0, s1, . . . , sne} ; p˜i)
)]− z − ce ≥ 0
where ω(X, z) = {z, x1, . . . , xne} denotes the information the consumer has after expanding
awareness, derived from the ne revealed partial valuations gathered in X ≡ [X, . . . ,X]′. Note
that in this notation, product indices were adjusted to the reduced decision problem, such that
j = 0, 1, . . . , ne indicates the hypothetical outside option and the products revealed from the
expansion.
Qe(ce, cs, z) defines the myopic net gain of expanding the search and optimally searching the
revealed products over immediately taking the outside option. It is myopic in the sense that it
ignores any possible future expansions, or searches beyond the products that are revealed. In
particular, note that V
(〈
Ω¯, ω(X, z)
〉
, {b0, s1, . . . , sne} ; p˜i)
)
is the value function of having an
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outside option offering z and optimally searching alternatives for which partial valuations in X
are known. Future expansions and any products in St or Ct are excluded from the set of available
actions in this value function. Finally, EX [·] defines the expectation operator integrating over
the joint distribution of the partial valuations in X. Formal details on the calculation of the
expectations and the value function are provided in Appendix B.
As for the search value, let the expansion value, denoted by ze, be defined as the value of the
hypothetical outside option that makes the consumer indifferent in the above decision. Formally,
ze is such that
Qe(ce, cs, z
e) = 0 (4)
which has a unique solution (see Appendix A).
In the case when X is independent of Y , the expansion value defined by (4) is linear in
the mean of the distribution of X.17 In particular, denote the mean of X by µX , and suppose
Ξ solves (4) for an alternative random variable X¯ = X − µX . As shown in Appendix B, the
expansion value then can conveniently be written as
ze = µX + Ξ(cs, ce)
Theorem 1 provides the first main result. It states that the optimal policy for the search
problem reduces to three simple rules based on a comparison of the search, purchase and ex-
pansion values. In particular, the rules imply that in each period t, it is optimal to take the
action with the largest reservation value defined by (1), (3), and (4). What is remarkable about
this result is that these reservation values rank the expected payoffs of the actions over all fu-
ture periods, despite being fully characterized by myopic comparisons to a hypothetical outside
option.
Theorem 1. Let z˜b(t) = maxk∈Ct u(xk, yk) and z˜s(t) = maxk∈St zsk denote the best products in
the consideration and awareness set in period t. An optimal policy for the search and expansion
problem is characterized by the following three rules:
Stopping rule: Purchase j ∈ Ct and end the search whenever zbj = z˜b(t) ≥ max {z˜s(t), ze} .
Search rule: Search j ∈ St whenever zsj = z˜s(t) ≥ max
{
z˜b(t), ze
}
.
Expansion rule: Expand awareness whenever ze ≥ max{z˜b(t), z˜s(t)}.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on results from the literature on multi-armed bandit problems.
In particular, it starts by assuming that the number of alternatives is known prior to search.
17A similar expression can be derived when only the mean of Y depends on X, but its variance remains constant.
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For this case, Keller and Oldale (2003) showed that a Gittins index policy is optimal. Using
a monotonicity condition, it is then shown that the Gittins index is independent of the avail-
ability of future expansions, implying that the policy is optimal independent of the consumer’s
knowledge of the number of alternatives. Finally, it is shown that the monotonicity condition
holds in the proposed search and expansion problem, and that the Gittins index is equivalent
to the simple reservation values defined above.
Based on Theorem 1, optimal search behavior can be analyzed using only (1), (3) and (4).
Weitzman (1979) showed that search values decrease in search costs, and increase if larger
realizations yj become more likely through a shift in the probability mass of Y .18 The same
applies to the expansion value. It decreases in expansion costs, and increases if probability mass
of X is shifted towards larger values. The expansion value also depends on search costs and the
conditional distribution of Y through the value function. Hence the expansion value decreases
in search costs, and increases if larger values of Y are more likely.
To see the latter, consider the case where each expansion only reveals a single product
(ne = 1). In this case, the myopic net gain of expansion reduces to (see Appendix B):
Qe(ce, cs, z) = EX [max {0, Qs(X, cs, z)}]− ce
For any c′s > cs, it holds that Qs(x, c′s, z) ≤ Qs(x, cs, z) for all finite values of x and z. Hence
Qe(ce, c
′
s, z) ≤ Qe(ce, cs, z) for all z. As Qe(ce, cs, z) is decreasing in z (see Appendix A), it
follows that the respective expansion values satisfy ze′ ≤ ze.
The optimal policy being fully characterized by simple rules leads to straightforward analysis
of optimal choices for any given search and consideration set. For example, consider a period t
where max {ze, z˜s(t)} < z˜b(t) such that the consumer stops searching. When decreasing search
costs sufficiently in this case, the inequality reverts and the consumer will instead either first
expand, or search the best product from the awareness set.
Monotonicity and Extensions
For the reservation value policy of Theorem 1 to be optimal, the expansion value needs to
fully capture the expected net benefits of an expansion, including the option value of being able
to continue expanding. The monotonicity condition used in the proof of the theorem ensures
that this holds. It states that the expected net benefits of expanding awareness do not increase
during search. Hence whenever the consumer is indifferent between taking the hypothetical
outside option and expanding awareness in t, he will either continue to be indifferent or take the
outside option in t+ 1. Whether an expansion is available in t+ 1 thus does not affect expected
net benefits of expanding awareness in t, and the expansion value fully captures the expected
18The latter implies that the distribution F (y) is shifted such that F˜ (y) ≤ F (y)∀y.
12
net benefits.19
For this monotonicity condition to hold, not all assumptions stated in the baseline search
problem are required. A range of alternative specifications that adjust these assumptions while
continuing to satisfy monotonicity can be conceived of. Below, I discuss those cases that I
believe to be most relevant for applied work. Formal results and further details are presented
in Appendix C.
Ranking in distribution: In various settings, the distribution of partial valuations depends
on the position at which a product is discovered. In this case, x1, . . . , xJ are realizations from
(non-identical) random variables X1, . . . , XJ . For example, in a market environment where
sellers compete in marketing efforts for consumers to become aware of their products early on,
sellers with on average better valuations may have a stronger incentive to be discovered first.20
Furthermore, in online settings, consumers also have the option of directly sorting product lists
(see e.g. Chen and Yao, 2017), which leads to the pattern that higher valued products are shown
early on.
In both cases, if only the mean of Xj depends on the position, and this mean is decreasing in
the position, then monotonicity is satisfied and the optimal policy continues to be characterized
by the reservation values, the only difference being that µX in the expansion value is updated
during search.
Unknown ne: A consumer may also not know how many alternatives he discovers when
expanding awareness. For example, the consumer may believe that there are still alternatives he
is not aware of and thus try to expand awareness, only to discover that he already is aware of all
the available alternatives. In these cases, a belief over how many alternatives are revealed per
expansion needs to be specified. The reservation value policy continues to be optimal, if these
beliefs remain constant during search, or more generally as long as monotonicity is satisfied.
The only difference in the baseline is that in Qe(ce, cs, z), expectations now additionally are
taken based on the beliefs over how many alternatives will be revealed.
Multiple awareness technologies: Finally, there may be multiple technologies through
which the consumer can become aware of more alternatives. In an online setting, for example,
each technology may represent a different online shop offering alternatives. In such settings, the
consumer also decides which technology to use to become aware of more alternatives. However,
by assigning each of the expansion actions an expansion value, the optimal policy can be adjusted
to accommodate this case.
For example, suppose that two such technologies are available in a period t. The technologies
19For the search and purchase values, no monotonicity condition is required. This follows from the fact that in the
independent comparison to the hypothetical outside option, both actions do not provide the option to continue
searching. After buying a product, search ends, and after having searched a product, the only option that remains
is to either buy the product or choose the hypothetical outside option. Hence for search and purchase actions,
at most one future period needs to be considered to fully capture the respective net benefits over immediately
taking the outside option.
20See for example the discussion on non-price advertising and the related references cited in Armstrong (2017).
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can differ both in the expected benefits and costs they offer per expansion. The set of available
actions then is At = Ct∪St∪e1∪e2, where el indicates expanding awareness through technology l.
Let zel denote the expansion value defined by (4) for technology l, accounting for the respective
beliefs and costs underlying each technology. If both technologies satisfy the monotonicity
condition, then as in Theorem 1, the optimal policy for this search problem selects in each
period t the action with the largest reservation value from At.
Limitations
Though the optimal policy applies to a broad class of search problems, two important lim-
itations exist. The first is that the monotonicity condition discussed above needs to hold for
the expansion value to be based on a myopic comparison. The second limitation is that in
the dynamic decision process, all available actions need to be independent of each other. More
specifically, performing one action in t does not affect the payoff of any other action that is
available in t.21
Independence is required to guarantee that the reservation values fully capture the effects
of each action. Recall that each reservation value does not depend on the availability of other
actions. If independence does not hold, however, the availability of other actions also influences
the expected payoff of an action. Hence choosing actions based only on reservation values that
disregard these effects will not be optimal. Below, I present alternative search problems that
violate independence to show this explicitly.
Costly recall: Consider a variation to the search problem, where purchasing a product in
the consideration set is costly unless it is bought immediately after it is searched. If in period
t product j is searched, then searching another product or expanding in t + 1 will change the
payoff of purchasing product j by adding the purchase cost.22 Similarly, in a search problem
where searching a product is more costly if the consumer first expanded further, expanding will
change the action of searching a product in the overview set.23 Appendix D discusses this in
more detail using a numerical example.
Learning: Independence is also violated for some types of learning. Consider a variation
of the search problem, where the consumer updates his beliefs on the distribution of Y . In this
case, by searching a product k and revealing yik, the consumer will update his belief about the
distribution of Y , thus affecting the expected payoffs of both expanding awareness and searching
other products. Hence independence is violated and the reservation value policy is no longer
optimal.24 Note, however, that as long as learning is such that only payoffs of actions that will
21Formally, this guarantees that the independence assumption in the branching bandits framework of Keller and
Oldale (2003) is satisfied.
22In the context of a multi-armed bandit problem, this case arises if there are nonzero costs of switching between
arms. See also Banks and Sundaram (1994) for a more general discussion of switching costs and the nonexistence
of optimal index-based strategies.
23The exception is if there are infinitely many alternatives. In this case, the optimal policy never prescribes to
recall an alternative.
24Adam (2001) studies a similar case where independence continues to hold across groups of products. However,
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be available in the future are affected, independence continues to hold.
Purchase without search: A final setting where independence does not hold is when a
consumer can buy a product without first inspecting it. In this case, when a consumer is aware of
a particular product he has two actions available. Either, he can search the product, or directly
purchase it and end the search. Clearly, when the consumer first searches the product, the
information revealed changes the payoff of buying the product. Hence independence is violated
and the reservation value policy is not guaranteed to be optimal. Doval (2018) studies this search
problem for the case where a consumer is aware of all available alternatives, and characterizes
the optimal policy under additional conditions.
4 Eventual Purchases and Market Demand
In an environment where consumers sequentially search products, market demand results from
aggregating different possible choice sequences leading to individual purchases. Conceptually,
this poses a major challenge, as the number of possible choice sequences grows faster than
exponentially in the number of available alternatives.25
Theorem 2 allows to circumvent this difficulty. It states that the purchase outcome of a
consumer solving the search problem is equivalent to a consumer directly buying a product that
offers the highest effective value. Importantly, a product’s effective value does not depend on
the various possible choice sequence leading to its purchase. Hence the market demand function
can be obtained without having to explicitly consider the myriad of possible choice sequences.
Theorem 2. Let
wj ≡
xj + min {ξj(cs), yj} if xj + min {ξj(cs), yj} < z
e
ze + f(hj) else
be the effective value for product j revealed after hj expansions, where f(hj) can be any non-
negative function that is strictly decreasing in hj. The solution to the search and awareness
expansion problem leads to the eventual purchase of the product with the largest effective value.
Proof. As a product always is bought, it suffices to show that product j is not bought whenever
there exists another product k with wk > wj . First, consider the case where k is discovered
before j (hk < hj). In this case, wk > wj if and only if either (i) w˜k ≡ min
{
zsk, z
b
k
} ≥ ze or (ii)
ze > w˜k > w˜j . In the former, the consumer will not expand beyond product k and hence never
buy product j. This follows from zsk ≥ ze guaranteeing that k is searched, and zbk ≥ ze implying
his results do not extend to the case with limited awareness, as the beliefs of Y also determine the expected
benefits of expanding awareness.
25For example, with only one alternative and an outside option, there are already four possible choice sequences.
With two alternatives, the number of possible choice sequences increases to 20.
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that k then is bought before expanding further. In the latter, wj = w˜j < wk = w˜k , and the
consumer expands such that both products are in the awareness set. Hence the eventual purchase
theorem of Choi et al. (2018) applies and product j will not be bought. Finally, consider the
case where k is discovered after or at the same time as j (hk ≥ hj). In this case, wk > wj if and
only if ze > w˜k > w˜j , which is the same as (ii) above.
This result generalizes the eventual purchase theorem of Armstrong (2017) and Choi et al.
(2018) to the case where the consumer has limited awareness. The generalization follows from
the following implication of the optimal policy: Whenever both the search and the purchase
value of a product in the awareness set exceed the expansion value, the consumer will buy the
product and end the search. This is captured in the effective values through the term ze+f(hj),
which ranks alternatives based on when during search they are discovered.
The first term in the effective value then is equivalent to what Choi et al. (2018) define as
effective value. As Choi et al. (2018) show, it fully characterizes the purchase decision conditional
on the awareness set. Intuitively, this term reflects that unless both the search and the purchase
value of an alternative are large relative to those of other alternatives, it will not be searched
and/or bought. For example, if the search value of an alternative j is smaller than both the
search and purchase value of another alternative k, then the optimal policy requires the consumer
to first search and then buy k, without first searching j.
The result continues to hold for extensions of the search problem, as long as the expansion
values are predetermined. The only difference then is that in the effective value of an alternative
j, the expansion value depends on the position at which j is revealed.
Based on Theorem 1, it is straightforward to derive market demand functions when hetero-
geneous consumers optimally solve the search and expansion problem. Once a distribution of
consumers’ valuations and/or search costs is specified, it is only necessary to derive the resulting
distribution of the effective values, which then yields the market demand. In particular, let the
effective value wij for each consumer i be a realization of the random variable Wj , and gather
the random variables inW =
[
W0, . . . ,W|J|
]′. For a unit mass of consumers the market demand
for a product j then is given by
Dj = PW (Wj ≥Wk∀k ∈ J\j) (5)
An important property of the demand resulting from consumers having limited awareness is
that it exhibits ranking effects; products that are revealed early on are more likely to be bought.
To gain some intuition, I now discuss the market demand for a particular environment, and then
show how ranking effects emerge.
Proposition 1 provides an explicit market demand function for a specific environment.26 The
26The intuition in more general cases remains the same. Having ne > 1 would add complexity in notation without
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first term in (6), PW˜
(
W˜k < z
e∀k ∈ Jh
)
, captures that a share of consumers will stop searching
before having become aware of j. The second term, P
(
W˜j > z
e
)
, reflects those consumers that
reveal j and do not continue expanding. This follows directly from the optimal policy, which
implies that consumers will stop searching as soon as both the search and purchase values exceed
the expansion value. Finally, the last term reflects those consumers which continue expanding
until they have reached the end of the list, and then return to buy product j.
Proposition 1. Let products j = 1, 2, . . . be horizontally differentiated such that the valuations
xj and yj are independent realizations of X and Y . Furthermore, let all consumers reveal only
one product per expansion (ne = 1) in the same order and be homogeneous with respect to their
search and expansion costs. The market demand for product j revealed after h expansions then
is given by
Dj|h = PW˜
(
W˜k < z
e∀k ∈ Jh
)[
PW˜j
(
W˜j ≥ ze
)
(6)
+ PW˜
(
W˜k < z
e∀k ∈ J\Jh
)
PW˜
(
W˜j ≥ W˜k∀k ∈ J\j|W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ J
)]
where W˜j = X + min {ξ(cs), Y }, and Jh ≡ {k|k ∈ {1, . . . , J}, hk ≤ h} is the set of products
revealed up to and including expansion h.
Proof. Four cases need to be considered. (i) If w˜k > ze for some k ∈ Jh, then wj < wk and
Theorem 2 implies that j is not bought. (ii) If (i) does not apply, then w˜j ≥ ze implies that
wj ≥ wk∀k ∈ J\Jh and j is bought. (iii) If (i) and (ii) do not apply and if w˜k ≥ ze for some
k ∈ J\Jh, then wj < wk and j is not bought. Finally, if (i)–(iii) do not apply, then wk = w˜k∀k
and j is bought if and only w˜j ≥ w˜k∀k ∈ J\j. Appropriately conditioning the joint probability
in (5) across these four cases then yields the expression.
To see the ranking effects in more detail, suppose that there are infinitely many alternatives
available. In this case, the probability of returning to product j will be zero, and the ranking
effect is equal to
Dj|h −Dj|h−1 =
[
P
(
W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ Jh
)
− P
(
W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ Jh−1
)]
P
(
W˜j > z
e
)
< 0
This expression reveals that the market demand for product j when moved to a later position
decreases due to an increase in the probability of search having stopped before having reached
j. In particular, some consumers will not buy the products at later positions, independent of
how they value them. This is the case whenever wk > ze for a product k revealed after hk
expansions, such that the consumer does not continue expanding. As a consequence, he does
not search or buy products that would be revealed at later expansions, independent of their
valuation.
providing additional insights.
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Intuitively, limited awareness leads to ranking effects through the probability of a consumer
not having stopped searching before becoming aware of a particular alternative. As search
progresses, it becomes less likely that the consumer has not yet bought an alternative and thus
ended the search. This leads to a lower demand for products the consumer discovers later on.
Though similar ranking effects can be induced by either random search where the order by which
products are searched is exogenously given, or by introducing product specific search costs into
directed search (e.g. Ursu, 2018). As the next section highlights, however, both approaches lead
to distinct search paths and market demand.
When there are only a finite number of products available, the above derivation does not
hold. However, Proposition 3 in Appendix A shows that negative ranking effects persist when
|J | <∞.
Finally, note that in the above environment, all consumers discover products in the same
order. In most settings, however, not all consumers will discover products in this way. For
such cases, (6) defines the market demand conditional on a particular product order. The
unconditional market demand then is obtained by taking expectations over the possible orders
in which products are revealed. Hence ranking effects persist in the more general case, except
for the case where all orders are equally likely.
5 Comparison of Search Outcomes
A range of sequential search problems are nested within the search and awareness expansion
problem. Directed search as in Weitzman (1979) results if the consumer has full awareness (i.e.
S0 = J), or expansion costs are equal to zero. The latter makes the consumer first expand
awareness until no further alternatives are left, after which he searches based on the selection
and stopping rule only. Classical random search (e.g. Lippman and McCall, 1976) results if in
addition the information received when becoming aware of an alternative is non-informative (e.g.
xj = 0∀j). In this case, the consumer will randomly search any of the available alternatives.
In more general settings, both random and directed search lead to different search paths and
market demand. To highlight these differences, I now present a simple numerical example.
The environment is as follows: A unit mass of consumers searches in a market with 2
horizontally differentiated alternatives and no outside option. Consumer i values alternative j
at xij + yij , where xij and yij are i.i.d. realizations of random variables X and Y respectively.
X and Y follow discrete uniform distributions with respective support xij ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} and
yij ∈ {−0.5, 0, 0.5}. Except for their valuations, consumers are homogeneous and have search
costs cs = 0.2 and expansion costs ce = 0.2. Each expansion reveals a single product (ne = 1),
hence search and expansion values are given by zsj = xj − 0.05 and ze = 0.3 respectively.
Initially, consumers are aware of only the first alternative, and then decide whether to search
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alternative 1, or become aware of alternative 2. Several search paths are possible. For example,
all consumers with xi1 = 0 will first expand awareness before searching either product. Con-
sumers with xi1 = 0.5 will first search alternative 1, before becoming aware of alternative 2.
Hence all consumers with xi1 = 0.5 and yi1 ∈ {0, 0.5} will end the search before becoming aware
of the second alternative.
These search paths differ from what the solutions to standard random and directed search
problems imply for consumers with the same valuations.
Random search: Under classical random search, consumers ignore the information con-
tained by xi1, and first search either alternative 1 or alternative 2 with equal probability. More
comparable to the search problem with limited awareness is a stopping problem where the or-
der by which products are revealed is predetermined and outside the consumers’ control. For
example, all consumers may first search alternative 1, before then deciding whether to continue
searching alternative 2. To make it comparable, I assume that searching the next product in-
curs costs cs + ce, which captures that the same amount of information is revealed as when
both expanding and searching the second product. In this case, the consumer stops searching if
x1 + y1 ≥ zs′2 ≈ 0.23.
The solution to this stopping problem with a predetermined search order still differs from the
optimal search path under limited awareness. When solving the search and awareness expansion
problem, consumers with bad partial valuations (xi1 = 0) will not immediately search alternative
1, and instead first become aware of the second alternative. In contrast, in the stopping problem,
whether a consumer first searches alternative 1 is independent of xi1.
Directed search: Under directed search, consumers directly compare xi1 and (after search-
ing) yi1 with xi2−0.05 to determine whether to first search and then buy alternative 1.27 Hence
consumers with xi1 = 0.5 and xi2 = 1 will always first search alternative 2. This contrasts the
optimal outcomes of the search problem with limited awareness, where consumers with xi1 = 0.5
and yi1 ∈ {0, 0.5} will never search alternative 2 because they stop searching before becoming
aware of it. Hence even when xi2 = 1, these consumers will never search it.
The distinct search paths lead to differences in aggregate demand. Based on the search
problem with limited awareness, the demand for alternative 1 is approximately D1 ≈ 0.65. This
highlights the ranking effect resulting from consumers initially being aware only of alternative
1.28 In classical random or directed search, this ranking effect will not occur as consumers are
equally likely to buy either product.
When all consumers first search alternative 1 due to exogenous factors, there is also a ranking
effect in the demand. In particular, in this case the demand will be D1 ≈ 0.72, indicating
a more pronounced ranking effect. The reason is that those consumers with xi1 = 0 and
27The reservation value in directed search is equivalent to the search value, hence the consumer searches based on
reservation values xij − 0.05.
28Note that D2 = 1−D1 < D1.
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yi1 = 0.5 will now buy alternative 1 before searching alternative 2.29 In contrast, under limited
awareness, consumers with xi1 = 0 will first become aware of alternative 2, and end up buying
it if xi2 ∈ {0.5, 1}. Hence search and expansion leads to less pronounced ranking effects, as
products with low partial valuations will not be searched initially.
The differences in outcomes across search problems highlighted in the above example indicate
two areas where accounting for limited awareness may be important. First, limited awareness can
lead to biased inference when using a revealed preference approach to infer preference parameters
and search costs from observed search paths.30 As the example shows, consumers not searching
some alternatives can be unrelated to the partial valuations (xij) of these products. A search
model that disregards limited awareness then may spuriously attribute this lack of search either
to consumers having low partial valuations or large search costs.
Given the prevalence of ranking effects in click-stream data, empirical studies have proposed
an approach to alleviate this problem (e.g. Chen and Yao, 2017; Ursu, 2018). In this approach,
search costs are modeled such that they depend on the position at which the alternatives are
revealed to the consumer. This, however, still implies that consumers compare partial valuations
across all products to inform their search decisions. For the consumer to buy the first product
before searching the second one then would require that (xi1 − xi2) + yi1 ≥ ξ(cs2), where cs2
is the cost of searching product 2. If valuations are observed by the researcher, observing a
consumer with xi1 + yi1 = 0.5 and xi2 = 1 requires that cs2 ≥ 0.5. In other words, rationalizing
this observed path based on the alternative formulation of the search problem requires very large
search costs.
In a more realistic setting, valuations are not observed by the researcher and a full estimation
approach will consider additional search decisions. Nonetheless, the above example suggests that
even when allowing search costs to depend on position, it is not guaranteed that such an approach
fully accounts for consumers having limited awareness. It thus remains unclear how well this
approach performs in settings where consumers have limited awareness.
Second, aggregate demand and ranking effects generated by consumers solving the search
problem under limited awareness are distinct from those generated by solutions to other se-
quential search problems. This suggests that limited awareness can lead to distinct equilibrium
outcomes in competitive settings where sellers set prices that are part of the valuations. For
example, an interesting result of Choi et al. (2018) is that as search costs increase, sellers lower
their prices. This happens as when consumers observe all prices prior to search, sellers have
an incentive to lower prices to be searched first. As search costs increase, the benefit of being
searched first increases, thus leading to lower prices. Limited awareness, however, mutes this
channel as consumers would observe only prices of the products that they are aware of. Hence
29Note
30Such an approach is used for example by De Los Santos et al. (2012); Honka (2014); Chen and Yao (2017); Ursu
(2018).
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under limited awareness, sellers’ demand functions depend on whether they are in the awareness
set of consumers, leading to different price setting incentives and equilibrium outcomes.
Myopic Policy
Besides comparing search outcomes across search problems, they can also be compared across
different feasible policies. Most interesting is a comparison of the optimal to a myopic policy.
The latter does not take into account choices available in the future. It thus always prescribes to
perform the action that offers the largest expected myopic net benefit over taking the currently
best option in the consideration set. If no action offers a positive expected myopic net benefit,
the myopic policy prescribes the consumer to end the search.31
For ne = 1, the myopic (expected) net benefits of expanding awareness are given byQe(ce, cs, z),
where z denotes the utility offered by the currently best option. This does not define myopia
in a narrow sense; it takes into account future searches of the newly revealed product. I ap-
ply this definition as a policy based on a narrower definition of myopia will never prescribe to
expand, given that an expansion generates positive net benefits only if a newly revealed prod-
uct is searched and then bought. Without any future actions, expanding awareness thus only
generates costs ce, but no benefits.
For ne > 1 it is less clear how myopic net benefits should be defined; they could take
into account all of the revealed products, only the best one, or ignore that ne > 1 all together.
However, in all these cases, the myopic net benefits will understate the full value of an expansion,
as the option value of being able to search the other revealed products is not taken into account.
Hence the myopic policy tends not to prescribe an expansion when it would be optimal, leading
to a premature stop of search.
Focusing on the case where ne = 1, the following reveals an additional channel how myopia
affects search decisions. Based on the above definition, a myopic policy prescribes the following
expansion rule: Expand whenever Qe(ce, cs, z(t)) ≥ max {maxj∈St Qs(xj , cs, z(t)), z(t)}, where
Qs(xj , cs, z(t)) is the expected myopic net benefit of searching j and z(t) ≡ maxj∈Ct uj is the
value offered by the best alternative in the consideration set in t.
This expansion rule differs from the optimal one in that bothQe(ce, cs, z(t)) andQs(xj , cs, z(t))
depend on z(t). Hence depending on z(t), the expansion rule may either prescribe to expand,
or search j. This contrasts the optimal expansion rule where the current best alternative enters
only through the purchase value, but not the search or expansion value. Hence it is optimal to
expand instead of searching j independent of the current best alternative.
This is highlighted in Figure 3, which depicts the myopic net benefits of searching an al-
ternative and expanding depending on the current best valuation. In the given example, the
optimal policy prescribes to expand, independent of z(t).32 The myopic policy will prescribe to
31This policy is similar to what Gabaix et al. (2006) refer to as directed cognition algorithm.
32More specifically, in the depicted case we have ze ≈ 0.55 and zsj ≈ 0.49, hence ze > zsj .
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expand only when z(t) > 0. If for example z(t) = −0.1, the myopic policy will contradict the
optimal one and prescribe to search j.
Figure 3 – Myopic net benefits of search and expansion for stan-
dard normal distributions, cs = ce = 0.2, xj = 0 and ne = 1.
The reason is that the myopic net benefits of expanding ignore the option to go back and
search j. Hence if an expansion reveals a low partial valuation xk, the consumer is left with z(t)
and cannot search j. Consequently, when z(t) is small relative to xj , the myopic net benefits of
expanding are smaller and the myopic policy selects to search j, instead of expanding. However,
when z(t) is large relative to xj , the option of being able to search j after expanding has no
value as it will be better to take z(t) instead of going back and searching j.
Finally, note that the definition of the search and expansion values implies that the myopic
is equivalent to the optimal stopping rule (in the case of ne = 1). As Qe(ce, cs, z) > 0 holds if
and only if ze > z, it is only optimal to stop searching if the myopic net benefits of expanding
are negative.33
This is a common property of optimal stopping rules in sequential search problems with free
recall (e.g. Weitzman, 1979). The myopic net benefits provide a lower bound to the total net
benefits of an action. Hence whenever it is optimal to stop searching, a myopic policy will also
prescribe to stop. Besides, whenever the myopic net benefits are negative, the monotonicity
condition guarantees that they remain negative in all remaining periods. Thus the reverse holds
as well, making the two stopping rules equivalent.
Learning
Finally, it is also worth pointing out that the search and awareness expansion problem nests
search problems where a consumer samples from an unknown distribution and updates beliefs
during search (e.g. Rothschild, 1974; Rosenfield and Shapiro, 1981; Bikhchandani and Sharma,
33The same holds for Qs(xj , cs, z).
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1996). Such learning problems result when the search and expansion problem is specified as
follows: Partial valuations xj are non-informative (e.g. xj = 0∀j), ne = 1, and the consumer
updates beliefs about the distribution of Y during search. In this case, each expansion reveals
a single product, which will be searched immediately.34 ne = 1 then implies At = Ct ∪ e in all
periods where the consumer can discover an additional product. Learning in this case does not
violate independence of actions, as it only occurs for future expansions, but does not affect the
valuations of the alternatives in the consideration set. Hence as long as beliefs are updated such
that monotonicity is satisfied, an optimal stopping rule will be based on the expansion value
defined in (4).
Adam (2001) extended these learning problems to the case where a consumer not only de-
cides when to stop searching (and learning), but also selects from which of multiple unknown
distributions to draw from. This generalized search problem is not directly nested within the
search and awareness expansion problem. However, it can be represented within the extension
that adds multiple awareness technologies discussed in Section (3). In particular, let each avail-
able awareness technology represent an unknown distribution the consumer can draw from. This
search problem then is equivalent to the one studied by Adam (2001), if each technology is as
defined as above for the case where the consumer is drawing from a single unknown distribution.
The optimal policy then again is a reservation value policy as described in Section (3).
6 Conclusion
This paper provides two results that apply to search problems where consumers have limited
awareness and first need to become aware of alternatives before being able to search them.
First, I show that the optimal policy is fully characterized by simple reservation values that
can be calculated based on a myopic comparison. Second, by proving that the search problem
can be transformed into a discrete choice problem, I show that market demand resulting from
consumers optimally searching can be derived without having to explicitly consider a myriad of
possible choice sequences.
Whereas the search problem introduced in this paper nests several classical search problems,
a numerical example reveals that limited awareness leads to search paths and market demand
that are distinct from those generated by existing approaches. In particular, I show that the
order in which products are searched can be independent of products the consumer initially is
not aware of, and that this leads to ranking effects in aggregate demand. The result suggests
that consumers’ limited awareness can affect equilibrium outcomes in competitive settings, as
well as influence inference based on observed search paths. It is left for future research to study
34As no new information is received when revealing a new product, expanding but not searching the newly revealed
product cannot be part of an optimal policy.
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the effects of limited awareness more generally.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Uniqueness of Expansion Value
Proposition 2. Qe(ce, cs, z) is continuous, weakly decreasing and differentiable. Furthermore,
(4) has a unique solution.
Proof. Let G˜(x˜) denote the joint distribution of X˜ =
[
X(1), . . . , X(ne)
]
, where X(1), . . . , X(ne)
are order statistics of X (which has cumulative density G(x)), such that the corresponding
(random) search values satisfy Zs(1) ≤ Zs(2) · · · ≤ Zs(ne). Differentiating (10) with respect to z
yields
∂Qe(ce, cs, z)
∂z
= −
ne−1∑
q=0
∫
χq(z)
[
1−
q∏
k=0
F (z − x(ne−k))
]
dG˜(x˜) ≤ 0
where χq(z) =
{
X˜|Zs(ne−q−1) ≤ z ≤ Zs(ne−q)
}
. Qe(ce, cs,∞) = −ce and Qe(ce, cs,−∞) = ∞
then imply that a solution to (4) exists. Finally, uniqueness requires Qe(ce, cs, z) to be strictly
decreasing at z = ze. ∂Qe(ce,cs,z
e)
∂z = 0 requires that∫
χq(ze)
[
1−
q∏
k=1
F (ze −X(q−k))
]
dG˜(x˜) = 0
holds for all q. This contradicts the definition of the expansion value value ze in equation (4),
as it implies Qe(ce, cs, ze) ≤ −ce < 0 (see Appendix B). Hence ∂Qe(ce,cs,z
e)
∂z < 0.
Theorem 1
Proof. Let Θ(Ωt, At, z) denote the value function of an alternative decision problem, where in
addition to the available actions in At, there exists a hypothetical outside option offering value
z. Suppose the consumer knows |J |. For this case, Theorem 1 of Keller and Oldale (2003) states
that a Gittins index policy (for a detailed discussion of Gittins index policies see e.g. Gittins
et al., 2011) is optimal, and that the following holds:
Θ(Ωt, At, z) = b−
∫ b
z
Πa∈At
∂Θ (Ωt, {a} , w)
∂w
dw (7)
where b is some finite upper bound of the immediate rewards.35 The Gittins index of action e
(expanding awareness) is defined by get = EX [Θ(Ωt+1, At+1\At, get )]. Now consider a period t
in which a future expansion will available in t+ 1 (known due to knowledge of |J |). In this case
we have
get = EX [Θ(Ωt+1, {e, s1, . . . , sne}, get )]− ce (8)
= EX
[
b−
∫ b
get
∂Θ (Ωt+1, {e} , w)
∂w
ne∏
k=1
∂Θ (Ωt+1, {sk} , w)
∂w
dw
]
− ce
where sk ∈ St+1\St∀k. Θ(Ωt, {sk} , z) is the value of a search problem with an outside option of-
fering z and the option of searching product k (with known partial valuation xk). Θ (Ωt+1, {e} , w)
is the value of a search problem with an outside option offering z and the only option to expand
the search. Finally, EX [·] is the expectation operator integrating over the joint distribution of
the ne random variables in X = [X, . . . ,X].
35Note that immediate rewards R(a) ≥ −max{cs, ce}, and that finite mean and variance of the distributions of X
and Y imply that for all realizations x, y there exists some b such that R(a) = xj + yj ≤ b.
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Optimality of the Gittins index policy then implies that when z ≥ get+1, the consumer
will choose the outside option in t + 1. Hence Θ (Ωt, {e} , w) = w∀w ≥ get+1 which yields
∂Θ(Ωt,{e},w)
∂w = 1∀w ≥ get+1. This implies that for get ≥ get+1, get does not depend on whether
future expansions are available, and the optimal policy is independent of the beliefs over the
number of available alternatives. As a result, as long as the Gittins index is weakly decreasing
during search, i.e. get ≥ get+1∀t, a Gittins index policy remains optimal in the case where the
consumer does not know |J | and has beliefs over the number of available alternatives.
It remains to show that get ≥ get+1∀t holds in the proposed search problem. When |J | =∞,
it is clear that get = get+1 as in both periods infinitely many expansions remain and q (the
consumer’s belief on whether a future expansion will be available) is constant. For |J | < ∞,
backwards induction yields that this condition holds: Suppose that in period t + 1, no future
expansions are available. In this case, the Gittins index is given by
get+1 = EX
[
b−
∫ b
get+1
ne∏
k=1
∂Θ (Ωt+1, {sk} , w)
∂w
dw
]
− ce
As 0 ≤ ∂Θ(Ωt,{e},w)∂w ≤ 1 and ∂Θ(Ωt,{sk},w)∂w ≥ 0, it holds that
EX
[
b−
∫ b
get
ne∏
k=1
∂Θ (Ωt+1, {sk} , w)
∂w
dw
]
≤ EX
[
b−
∫ b
get
∂Θ (Ωt, {e} , w)
∂w
ne∏
k=1
∂Θ (Ωt, {sk} , w)
∂w
dw
]
which implies gt ≥ gt+1.
Finally, as Θ(Ωt+1, {e, s1, . . . , sne}, get ) = V
(〈
Ω¯, ω(x, z)
〉
, {b0, s, . . . , sne} ; p˜i)
)
of the expan-
sion value implies ze = get . Similarly, the definition of the search and purchase values (in 1 and
4) are equivalent to the definition of Gittins index values for these actions and it follows that
the reservation value policy is the Gittins index policy.
Negative ranking effect
Proposition 3. Dj|h −Dj|h−1 < 0 holds for the market demand given by Proposition (1).
Proof. Independence implies
PW˜
(
W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ Jh
)
PW˜
(
W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ J\Jh
)
= PW˜
(
W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ J
)
Hence
Dj|h −Dj|h−1 =
[
P
(
W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ Jh
)
− P
(
W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ Jh−1
)] [
P
(
W˜j > z
e
)
+ PW˜
(
W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ J
)
P
(
W˜j ≥ W˜k∀k ∈ J\j|W˜k ≤ ze∀k ∈ J
)]
<0
B Search and expansion values
The search value of a product j is defined by equation (1) and sets the myopic net gain of the
search over immediately taking a hypothetical outside option offering utility z to zero. This
myopic net gain can be calculated as follows:
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Qs(xj , cs, z) = EY [max{0, xj + Y − z}]− cs
=
∫ ∞
z−xj
(xj + y − z)dF (y)− cs
= [(xj + y − z)F (y)]yj=∞y=z−xj −
∫ ∞
z−xj
F (y)dy − cs
=
∫ ∞
z−xj
[1− F (y)] dy − cs
Substituting ξj = z − xj then yields (2).
The expansion value is defined by equation (4) and sets the expected myopic net gain of
expanding the search over immediately taking a hypothetical outside option offering utility z to
zero. Using (7), this myopic net gain can be rewritten as:
Qe(ce, cs, z) = EX
[
V
(〈
Ω¯, ω(X, z)
〉
, {b0, s, . . . , sne} ; p˜i)
)]− z − ce
= EX
[
b−
∫ b
z
ne∏
k=1
∂Θ (Ωt, {sk} , w)
∂w
dw
]
− z − ce
Note that Θ (Ωt, {sk} , w) = w+max {0,−cs + EY [max {xk + Y − w, 0}]} = w+max {0, Qs(xk, cs, w)}.
Since Qs(xk, cs, w) is weakly decreasing in w and Qs(xk, cs, w) = 0 for w = zsk, it follows that
∂Θ (Ωt, {sk} , w)
∂w
=
{
1 ∀w ≥ zsk
1 + ∂Qs(xk,cs,w)∂w = F (w − xk) ∀w < zsk
(9)
Let X˜ ≡ [X(1), . . . , X(ne)] where X(1), . . . , X(ne) are order statistics of X (with cdf G(x)),
such that the corresponding search values (which are non-linear transformations of X) satisfy
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Zs(1) ≤ Zs(2) · · · ≤ Zs(ne).36 Using the above and defining Zs(0) ≡ z then yields:37
Qe(ce, cs, z) = EX˜
[
b−
∫ b
max{Zs
(ne)
,z}
1dz −
∫ max{Zs(ne),z}
max{Zs
(ne−1),z}
F
(
w −X(ne)
)
dw − · · ·
· · · −
∫ max{Zs(1),z}
z
ne−1∏
k=0
F
(
w −X(ne−k)
)
dw
]
− z − ce
Qe(ce, cs, z) = EX˜
[
max{Zs(ne), z} −
∫ max{Zs(ne),z}
max{Zs
(ne−1),z}
F
(
w −X(ne)
)
dw − · · ·
· · · −
∫ max{Zs(1),z}
z
ne−1∏
k=0
F
(
w −X(ne−k)
)
dw
]
− z − ce
= EX˜
[∫ max{Zs(ne),z}
max{Zs
(ne−1),z}
[
1− F (w −X(ne))] dw − · · ·
· · · −
∫ max{Zs(1),z}
z
[
1−
ne−1∏
k=0
F
(
w −X(ne−k)
)]
dw
]
− ce
Qe(ce, cs, z) = EX˜
[
ne−1∑
q=0
∫ max{Zs(ne−q),z}
max{Zs
(ne−q−1),z}
[
1−
q∏
k=0
F
(
w −X(ne−k)
)]
dw
]
− ce (10)
In the case when each expansion only reveals a single product (ne = 1), the above simplifies
to
Qe(ce, cs, z) = EX
[∫ max{Zs,z}
z
[1− F (w −X)] dw
]
− ce
= EX
[
max
{
0,
∫ Zs
z
[1− F (w −X)] dw
}]
− ce
= EX
[
max
{
0,
∫ ∞
z
[1− F (w −X)] dw −
∫ ∞
Zs
[1− F (w −X)] dw
}]
− ce
= EX
[
max
{
0,
∫ ∞
z
[1− F (w −X)] dw − cs
}]
− ce
= EX [max {0, Qs(X, cs, z)}]− ce
To derive ∂Qe(ce,cs,z)∂z from (10) and show that
∂Qe(ce,cs,z
e)
∂z < 0 (required for Proposition 2),
I present the case for ne = 2 and with Y being independent of X, thus simplifying exposition.
More general cases can be derived in a similar fashion. The steps are shown below, where I
define X(0) ≡ z − ξ.
36The order in X(1), . . . , X(ne) can differ if the conditional distributions vary such that ξ(k) < ξ(k−1) in (2).
37The second step follows from expanding with −max{Zs
(ne)
, z} + max{Zs
(ne−1), z} +
∫max{Zs(ne),z}
max{Zs
(ne−1),z}
1dw −
max{Zs
(ne−1), z}+max{Z
s
(ne−2), z}+
∫max{Zs(ne−1),,z}
max{Zs
(ne−2),z}
1dw · · · −max{Zs
(1)
, z}+ z + ∫max{Zs(1),z}z 1dw.
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Qe(ce, cs, z) =EX˜
[
ne−1∑
q=0
∫ max{X(ne−q)+ξ,z}
max{X(ne−q)+ξ,z}
[
1−
q∏
k=0
F
(
w −X(ne−k)
)]
dw
]
− ce
=− ce +
∫ ∞
z−ξ
∫ z−ξ
−∞
· · ·
∫ z−ξ
−∞
[∫ x(ne)+ξ
z
1− F (w − x(ne)) dw
]
dG˜(x˜)
+
∫ ∞
z−ξ
∫ ∞
z−ξ
∫ z−ξ
−∞
· · ·
∫ z−ξ
−∞
[∫ x(ne)+ξ
x(ne−1)+ξ
1− F (w − x(ne))dw
+
∫ x(ne−1)+ξ
z
1− F (w − x(ne))F (w − x(ne−1)) dw
]
dG˜(x˜)
+ · · ·
+
∫ ∞
z−ξ
· · ·
∫ ∞
z−ξ
[
ne−1∑
q=0
∫ x(ne−q)+ξ
x(ne−q−1)+ξ
1−
q∏
k=0
F
(
w − x(ne−k)
)
dw
]
dG˜(x˜) (11)
For ne = 2, this reduces to
Qe(ce, cs, z) =− ce +
∫ ∞
z−ξ
∫ z−ξ
−∞
[∫ x(2)+ξ
z
1− F (w − x(2)) dw
]
dG˜(x˜)
+
∫ ∞
z−ξ
∫ ∞
z−ξ
[∫ x(2)+ξ
x(1)+ξ
1− F (w − x(2))dw
+
∫ x(1)+ξ
z
1− F (w − x(2))F (w − x(1))dw
]
dG˜(x˜)
Differentiating with respect to z then yields
∂Qe(ce, cs, z)
∂z
=−
∫ z−ξ
−∞
[∫ z
z
1− F (w − x(2))dw
]
dG˜
(
x(1)|x(2) = z − ξ
)
+
∫ ∞
z−ξ
[∫ x(2)+ξ
z
1− F (w − x(2))dw
]
dG˜
(
x(2)|x(1) = z − ξ
)
−
∫ ∞
z−ξ
∫ z−ξ
−∞
[
1− F (z − x(2))dw
]
dG˜ (x˜)
−
∫ ∞
z−ξ
[· · · ] dG˜ (x(1)|x(2) = z − ξ)
−
∫ ∞
z−ξ
[∫ x(2)+ξ
z
1− F (w − x(2))dw
+
∫ z
z
1− F (w − x(2))F (w − x(1))dw
]
dG
(
x(2)|x(1) = z − ξ
)
−
∫ ∞
z−ξ
∫ ∞
z−ξ
[
1− F (z − x(2))F (z − x(1))dw
]
dG (x˜)
=−
∫ ∞
z−ξ
∫ z−ξ
−∞
[
1− F (z − x(2))dw
]
dG (x˜)
−
∫ ∞
z−ξ
∫ ∞
z−ξ
[
1− F (z − x(2))F (z − x(1))dw
]
dG (x˜)
Note that − ∫∞
z−ξ [· · · ] dG˜
(
x(1)|x(2) = z − ξ
)
= 0, as x(2) = z−ξ implies that x(1) ≥ z−ξ occurs
with probability zero.
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For ∂Qe(ce,cs,z
e)
∂z = 0 to hold, the above shows that the following two conditions need to hold:∫ ∞
ze−ξ
∫ ze−ξ
−∞
[
1− F (ze − x(2))dw
]
dG (x˜) = 0∫ ∞
ze−ξ
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
[
1− F (ze − x(2))F (ze − x(1))dw
]
dG (x˜) = 0
Given that F (·) is a cumulative density,38 these two conditions imply the following:
A ≡
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
∫ ze−ξ
−∞
[∫ x(2)+ξ
ze
1− F (w − x(2))dw
]
dG˜(x˜)
≤
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
∫ ze−ξ
−∞
[
1− F (ze − x(2)) [x(2) + ξ − ze]]dG˜(x˜)
≤0
B ≡
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
[∫ x(2)+ξ
x(1)+ξ
1− F (w − x(2)) dw
]
dG˜(x˜)
≤
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
[
1− F (ze − x(2))] [x(2) − x(1)]dG˜(x˜)
≤
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
[
1− F (ze − x(2))F (ze − x(1))] [x(2) − x(1)] dG˜(x˜)
≤0
C ≡
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
[∫ x(1)+ξ
ze
1− F (w − x(2))F (w − x(1))dw
]
dG˜(x˜)
≤
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
∫ ∞
ze−ξ
[
1− F (ze − x(2))F (ze − x(1))] [x(1) + ξ − ze] dG˜(x˜)
≤0
As Qe(ce, cs, z) = A+B+C−ce, it follows that ∂Qe(ce,cs,z
e)
∂z = 0 implies Qe(ce, cs, z
e) ≤ −ce < 0.
To show that ze is linear in the mean of X given independence of Y , a change in variables
is applied to (11). In particular, substituting x¯(k) = x(k) − µX∀k ∈ {1, . . . , ne} (again denoting
x¯(0) ≡ z − ξ) and denoting x¯ =
[
x¯(1), . . . , x¯(ne)
]
in (11) yields
Qe(ce, cs, z) =− ce +
∫ ∞
z−µX−ξ
∫ z−µX−ξ
−∞
· · ·
∫ z−µX−ξ
−∞
[∫ x¯(ne)+ξ
z
1− F (w − x¯(ne)) dw
]
dG˜(x¯)
+
∫ ∞
z−µX−ξ
∫ ∞
z−µX−ξ
∫ z−µX−ξ
−∞
· · ·
∫ z−µX−ξ
−∞
[∫ x¯(ne)+ξ
x¯(ne−1)+ξ
1− F (w − x¯(ne)) dw
+
∫ x¯(ne−1)+ξ
z
1− F (w − x¯(ne))F (w − x¯(ne−1))dw
]
dG˜(x¯)
+ · · ·
+
∫ ∞
z−µX−ξ
· · ·
∫ ∞
z−µX−ξ
[
ne−1∑
q=0
∫ x¯(ne−q)+ξ
x¯(ne−q−1)+ξ
1−
q∏
k=0
F
(
w − x¯(ne−k)
)
dw
]
dG˜(x¯)
38Being a cumulative density implies F (y) ∈ [0, 1] ∀y ∈ R and ∂F (y)
∂y
≥ 0.
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Let Ξ ≡ z − µX , such that
Qe(ce, cs,Ξ + µX) = E ˜¯X
[
ne−1∑
q=0
∫ max{X¯(ne−q)+ξ,Ξ}
max{X¯(ne−q−1)+ξ,Ξ}
[
1−
q∏
k=0
F
(
w − X¯(ne−k)
)]
dw
]
where the expectations operator now works on the order statistics ˜¯X =
[
X¯(1), . . . , X¯(ne)
]
. When
Ξ solves Qe(ce, cs,Ξ +µX) = 0, z = Ξ +µX solves Qe(ce, cs, z) = 0, and thus ze = µX + Ξ when
Y is independent of X.
C Monotonicity and Extensions
Monotonicity of the Gittins index values (get ≥ get+1∀t) is satisfied whenever the following holds:
0 ≤EX,Y,ne,J,t
[
Θ(Ωt+1, A˜t+1, g
e
t )
]
− EX,Y,ne,J,t+1
[
Θ(Ωt+2, A˜t+2, g
e
t+1)
]
(12)
where get is the Gittins index of expanding (defined by (8)), and A˜t+1 ≡ {e, s1, . . . , sne} is the set
of actions available in t+1 containing the newly revealed products and (if available) the possible
future expansion. The expectation operator EX,Y,ne,J,t [·] integrates over the following random
realizations, where the respective joint distribution may be time-dependent: (i) Partial valua-
tions drawn from X = [X1, . . . , Xne ]; (ii) conditional distributions FY |X=x(y); (iii) the number
of revealed alternatives (ne); (iv) whether an additional expansion is available, determined by
the beliefs over |J |.
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to determine all possible specifications of the joint
distribution which satisfy this condition. However, Proposition 4 provides several specifications
that are of interest and for which (12) holds (see also Section 3).
Proposition 4. (12) holds for the below deviations from the baseline model:
i) Y is independent of X. The revealed partial valuations in X are i.i.d. with time-dependent
cumulative density Gt(x) such that Gt (x) ≥ Gt+1 (x)∀x ≥ ze − ξ.
ii) The consumer does not know how many alternatives are revealed when expanding aware-
ness. Instead, he has beliefs such that with each expansion, at most the same number of
alternatives is revealed as in the last expansion (ne,t+1 ≤ ne,t).
Proof. Each part is proven using slightly different arguments.
i) Let x˜ ≡ maxk∈{1,...,ne} xk. If z˜s= x˜ + ξ ≤ ze, Θ(Ωt+1, A˜t+1, ze) = 1, whereas for x˜ >
ze − ξ, ∂Θ(Ωt+1,{e,s1,...,sne},ze)∂x˜ ≥ 0 (which follows from (9)). Independence implies that
the cumulative density of the maximum x˜ is G˜t(x) = Gt(x)ne . Consequently, whenever
the distribution of X shifts such that Gt(x) ≥ Gt+1(x)∀x ≥ ze − ξ, larger values of
Θ(Ωt+1, A˜t+1, g
e
t ) become less likely in t+ 1, and hence (12) holds.
ii) Since ∂Θ(Ωt+1,{sk},w)∂w ≤ 1, we have ∂Θ(Ωt+1,A˜t+1,g
e
t )
∂ne
≥ 0. Hence (12) holds given ne,t+1 ≤
ne,t.
Based on this monotonicity condition, Proposition 5 generalizes Theorem 1. It implies that
whenever (12) holds, the expansion value can be calculated based on the expected myopic net
gain of expanding over immediately taking the hypothetical outside option. Hence, whenever
(12) holds, the optimal policy continues to be fully characterized by reservation values that can
be obtained without having to consider many future periods.
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Proposition 5. Whenever (12) is satisfied, Theorem 1 continues to hold (with appropriate
adjustment of the expansion value’s time-dependence).
Proof. Follows directly from the proof of Theorem 1.
D Costly Recall Example
The following simple example provides some intuition on why the reservation value policy is not
optimal when there is costly recall.
Suppose only 2 alternatives are available. The consumer initially is aware only of the first
alternative with partial valuation x1 = 0.5. X and Y follow discrete uniform distributions with
respective support x2 ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} and yj ∈ {−0.5, 0, 0.5} for j = 1, 2. Search and expansion
costs are given by cs = 0.2 and ce = 0.1 respectively. Moreover, recall is costly such that the
consumer incurs costs cr = 2cs if he searches alternative 1 only after having expanded awareness.
In this environment, the policy of Theorem 1 prescribes to first expand to discover the second
alternative.39 Following this policy yields an expected total payoff of
Uo =
1
3
[
−ce − cr + 1
2
]
+
1
3
[
−ce − cs + 1
3
(
1
2
+ 1
)
+
1
3
(
−cr + 1
3
(
1
2
+ 1
))]
+
1
3
[−ce − cs + 1]
≈0.31
Now consider an alternative policy that prescribes to first search alternative 1, and then
continue based on the reservation value policy (i.e. expand only if x1 + y1 ≤ ze). Following this
policy yields an expected total payoff of
Ua =
1
3
[−cs + 1] + 1
3
[
−cs + 1
2
]
+
1
3
[
−cs − ce + 1
3
(
−cs + 1
2
)
+
1
3
(−cs + 1)
]
≈0.39
Following this alternative policy thus yields a larger expected total payoff, showing that the
reservation value policy is not optimal.
This results from the expansion value ze being based only on the net benefits of finding a
value x2 > x1. However, due to the recall costs, an expansion not only reveals a possibly better
product, but also makes searching product 1 more costly. By not accounting for these added
costs, ze overstates the expected benefits of expanding. As a result, comparing zs1 with ze does
not appropriately reflect a comparison of the expected total future payoffs of these actions, and
thus may fail to prescribe the optimal action to take.
39In particular, we have ze = 0.5 and zs1 = 0.45. Furthermore, at cost cr = 2cs, we have z
s′
1 = 0.15.
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